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1. Introduction
In a pay-as-you-go public pension system, the balanced pension contribution rate is
determined as the product of the system old-age dependency ratio (the ratio of the
number of pensioners to that of workers) and of the aggregate replacement ratio (the
ratio of average pension to average wage). Though the rise of normal (and effective)
retirement age can slow down the secular rise of the system dependency ratio, the de-
crease of the aggregate replacement ratio is also needed to keep the pension contribution
rate constant or even reduce its value. There are two methods to achieve this aim:
(a) to diminish the newly granted benefits and (b) to devalue the benefits in progress
with respect to the average wage. Method (a) is very difficult politically and is very
slow; method (b) can be rather easy politically and is very fast in practice; only the
indexation of benefits in progress should be linked to prices rather than wages and the
real growth rate of the average wage should be fast enough. We call the reduction of
pension contribution rate forced if the balance of the public pension system is preserved
through excessive wage-hikes and irritable relative devaluation of pensions in progress.
We shall study such a policy in the present paper.
During 2016 and 2018 in Hungary, the gross and net real wages grew much faster
than the GDP: altogether by 28% vs. 10%. One part of this rise was caused by the
improved economic conditions and the labor shortage due to emigration. The other
part was due to the forced reduction of the employer’s pension contribution rate from
22 to 14.5% (the employee’s counterpart remained 10% and the employer’s health care
contribution rate was fixed at 5%). Due to the falling employer’s contribution rate,
the accumulated growth of total wage cost was only 20.3% while the price indexation
temporarily preserved the balance of the pension system. A further continuation of the
reduction is envisaged for another three years, ending with a corresponding employer’s
pension contribution rate of 8.5%.
In this paper, we consider the simplest overlapping cohorts model to analyze this
unorthodox process: every cohort is represented by a single person; and every cohort’s
life expectancy is constant; only the cohort’s total wage cost rises and the employer’s
contribution rate decreases, raising the net wage and the initial pension even faster.
(Section 5 also takes into account the impact of the rising normal retirement age in-
cluding longer contributive period and later retirement.) We shall neglect the following
important factors: lower contribution rates may raise the labor participation rate, real
wage acceleration increases the optimal flexible retirement age (both favorable to re-
duction) but secular aging of population and the negative balance of migration increase
the system dependency ratio (both unfavorable to reduction).
The model shows the infeasibility of the forced reduction of pension contribution rate
and the unfairness of even the less radical policy. (We call a pension policy unfair among
cohorts if subsequent cohorts receive strongly different benefit streams.) Seven tables of
the paper numerically illustrate the various possible outcomes of the process started by
the Hungarian government. Even those optimistic paths which are theoretically feasible,
signal a dramatic rise in the inequality among subsequent cohorts.
Though the model depicts the forced reduction of pension contribution rate in a
single country in a single period, namely in Hungary during 2016–2021, probably other
countries had or will have similar problems. Just to give a well-known example: the
long-run unsustainability of the U.S. Social Security system has been well-known but
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no U.S. administration outlined the resolution of the problem: raising the contribution
rate or reducing the benefit rate (Diamond and Orszag, 2005, especially Chapter 5). A
similar idea of a radical reduction of the Social Security contribution rate through partial
privatization was modeled by Feldstein (1996) and Kotlikoff (1997) but its realism is
also questionable (Diamond and Orszag, 2005, especially Chapter 8; Simonovits, 2003,
Chapter 15).
Since the indexation of benefits in progress plays a dominant role in the issue, we
have to refer to the corresponding literature. Simonovits (2003, Chapter 14) mod-
eled the temporary budgetary saving of replacing wage indexation by price indexation.
Legros (2006) studied related issues when comparing the French and the German pen-
sion systems. Barr and Diamond (2008, Subsection 5.1.4) discussed the same problem
in a general context. Lovell (2009) dissected the design errors of the US Social Secu-
rity. Simonovits (2018, Section 14.4) analyzed the impact of indexation on the lifetime
income redistribution from ex ante short-lived and lower earners to ex ante long-lived
and higher earners. For the problems of proper wage indexation in NDC under rising
life expectancy and cohort-specific retirement age, see Knell (2018).
The structure of the remainder the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a rough
estimate on the required real wage growth rate to reach the targeted contribution rate.
Section 3 discusses the dynamics of the time-invariant pension system. Sections 4 and 5
study time-variant pension systems with endogenous vs. exogenous gross wages. Section
6 draws the conclusions.
2. A rough estimate
In the folklore of the pension economics, there is a well-known identity: the balanced
pension contribution rate (τ) is determined as the product of the system old-age de-
pendency ratio (µ, the ratio of the number of pensioners to that of workers) and of the
aggregate replacement ratio (γw, the ratio of average pension to average total wage cost,
subindex w refers to the type of wage):
τ = µγw, where µ =
P
W
and γw =
b¯
w¯
, (1)
P andW denote the number of pensioners and workers, respectively, and b¯ and w¯ denote
the average pension and total wage cost, respectively. If the balanced contribution rate τ
is significantly reduced, then at least the dependency ratio µ or the average replacement
ratio γw should also be reduced.
To give an elementary numerical illustration on the planned parametric changes in
terms of gross wage u in Hungary during 2018–2021, we shall heroically presume that
the number of workers and pensioners and the latter’s benefits are invariant, therefore
τ2016u2018 = τ2021u2021.
The annual gross wage growth factor needed to reduce the pension contribution rate to
the target one is given as
gu = 3
√
u2021
u2018
= 3
√
τ2018
τ2021
.
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Furthermore, anticipating from Section 4 the connection between the gross wage and
the more relevant total wage cost: wt = ϕtut (see (4) below), the latter’s growth factor
is equal to
gw = 3
√
w2021
w2018
= 3
√
ϕ2021u2021
ϕ2018w2018
.
Inserting τ2018 = 0.25, ϕ2018 = 1.2 and running τ2021 from 0.24 to 0.19, Table 1 displays
the steeply rising wage growth rates.
Table 1. Target pension contribution rate – wage growth rates
Target pension Annual real growth rate of
contribution rate (2021) gross wage total wage cost
τ2021 100(gu − 1) 100(gw − 1)
0.24 1.4 1.1
0.23 2.8 2.2
0.22 4.4 3.5
0.21 6.0 4.8
0.20 7.7 6.2
0.19 9.6 7.7
In the remainder, we shall analyze three related models each showing that assuming
on a number of favorable factors, such a reduction is temporarily possible with wage
growth slower than given in Table 1. But the presumed wage growth is still unrealistic;
and beyond the grace period, the process should be suspended or even reversed.
3. Time-invariant system
As a prelude to the analysis of the current time-variant Hungarian pension system, we
turn to the much simpler dynamic time-invariant system. Let S and T be the time
spent in work and in retirement, respectively, which remain constant over time. We
assume that in year 0, the gross wage is equal to 1, the net wage is equal to ψ ∈ (0, 1).
Let τ be the pension contribution rate, 0 < τ < 1. Further details on the contribution
rates are given in next Section.
Let us assume that the annual real growth factor of the gross wage is equal to g > 1,
i.e. the net real wage of year −k was ψg−k, and the corresponding pension benefit first
granted in year −k + 1 (following lagged price-indexation) b−k = δSψg−k, where δ > 0
is the annual accrual rate and k = 1, 2, . . . , T .
In total, S cohorts pay Sτ contribution, while the annual pension expenditure is
equal to
B =
T∑
k=1
b−k = δSψ
T∑
k=1
g−k.
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We use the formula for the sum of the geometric series and introduce notation
T (g) =
T∑
k=1
g−k =
1− g−T
g − 1 for g > 1 and T (1) = T. (2)
Equalizing the contributions and the revenues yield
Theorem 1. In a time-invariant system with a given growth factor g ≥ 1, there is
a unique balanced pension contribution rate
τ(g) = δψT (g). (3)
To understand the operation of the price-indexed benefit system, it is worth compar-
ing it with a wage-indexed one without a one-year delay, i.e. b∗−k = δSψ, k = 1, 2, . . . , T .
In such a system, the balanced contribution rate is equal to
τ(1) = δψT. (3∗)
Comparing (3) and (3*) we can interpret T (g) as the number of years in a hypothetical
wage indexation system generating the same pension contribution rate as the actual
price indexed system does.
Note also that the higher the growth rate, the lower the T (g). If τ ∈ (0, 1) is given,
then there exists a unique balanced growth factor g, for which τ(g) = τ .
In our framework, the dependency ratio and the average replacement ratio are re-
spectively equal to
µ =
T
S
< 1 and γv =
τ
µψ
.
Finally, we introduce the benefit ratio of the youngest to the oldest pensioners: r =
b−1/b−T = gT .
Table 2 helps understanding a well-known pitfall and an advantage of price indexa-
tion: the higher the wage growth rate, the lower the average replacement ratio (bad),
also the lower the pension contribution rate (good). The lag in valorization [(6)] causes
a small part of the drop, and the lagging of pensions in progress [(7)] behind the initial
one in indexation causes the large part. Quantitatively, with T = 20, S = 33 years
and δ = 0.023 (as in Hungary), the replacement ratio drops from 0.621 to 0.473 as the
growth rate rises from 2 to 5%, while the pension contribution rate drops from 0.250 to
0.191. The same distortion arises with r which rises from 1.486 to 2.653.
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Table 2. The impact of the real growth rate of wage
Real growth Average net Pension Youngest–oldest
rate of wage replacement ratio contribution rate benefit ratio
100(g − 1) γv τ r = b−1/b−T
0 0.759 0.306 1.000
1 0.685 0.276 1.220
2 0.621 0.250 1.486
3 0.565 0.228 1.806
4 0.516 0.208 2.191
5 0.473 0.191 2.653
Without struggling with dynamic effects, the equivalence of low pension contribution
rate and high growth has been established. Now we move to the genuine dynamic
analysis.
4. Exogenous contribution rate and endogenous gross wage
The main objective of the paper is to model the impact of the unorthodox Hungarian
wage and contribution policy on the pension system. In this Section, we shall determine
the evolution of the paths of the total, the gross and the net wages, and the cohort-
specific pension benefits when the pension and the health contribution rates and the
personal income tax rate are given exogenously. This requires the separation of val-
orization of initial pensions and of indexing of pensions in progress on the one hand and
the employee’s (E) and the employer’s (firm, F) contribution rates, on the other hand.
Let θE and θF be the exogenously given and constant health care contribution rates
paid by the employee and the employer (the former also includes the personal income
tax rate), respectively. Let τE and τFt be the exogenously given pension contribution
rates paid by the employee and the employer, respectively, their sum being the pension
contribution rate τt = τE + τFt —the latter two time-variant. By definition, for a given
gross wage ut, the total and the net wages in year t are respectively equal to
wt = ϕtut, ϕt = 1 + θF + τFt (4)
and
vt = ψut, where ψ = 1− θE − τE . (5)
Reflecting the logic of the current Hungarian pension system, the initial representa-
tive benefit in year t is proportional to the net representative wage in year t− 1:
bt = δSvt−1. (6)
N.B.: (6) is not valid for individual wage paths like (ωt−k); vt−1 is replaced by
Q−1
∑Q
k=1 ωt−kvt−1/vt−k, Q > 1 is the number of contributive years counted.
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Due to the price indexation of benefits in progress, in year t (in real terms) the
representative benefit set k − 1 years earlier is still equal to
bt−k = δSvt−k, k = 2, . . . , T. (7)
Table 3 compares two overlapping cohorts retiring in years 0 and 1 and having almost
the same earning path except for the start and the ending but totally different (flat)
benefit paths.
Table 3. Overlapping wage and benefit paths
−S + 1 −S · · · –1 0 1 · · · T T + 1
u−S+1 u−S · · · u−1 b0 b0 · · · b0
u−S · · · u−1 u0 b1 · · · b1 b1
Note. b0 = βψu−1 vs. b1 = βψu0, u0 > u−1.
The balance equation of the pension system in year t is given by
τtSut =
T∑
k=1
bt−k. (8)
Substituting (5)–(7) into (8) results in
τtut = δψ
T∑
k=1
ut−k, t = 0, 1, . . . . (9)
Since we consider time-variant systems which after a short transition become time-
invariant, we return to the time-invariant system of Section 3, when τt ≡ τ . Then (9)
simplifies to
ut =
δψ
τ
T∑
k=1
ut−k, (10)
and a kind of stability can be proved for the relative gross wages (xt) = (ut/gt). For-
mally, we have
Theorem 2. The time-invariant adjustment process (10) is globally relatively sta-
ble.
Proof. Introducing notation
ak =
δψ
τ
g−k > 0, k = 1, . . . , T ;
(10) reduces to
xt =
T∑
k=1
akxt−k, t = 0, 1, . . . (11)
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where x−1 = 1, . . . , x−T are given. Note that due to (2)–(3),
∑T
k=1 ak = 1 holds, and
x−1 = · · · = x−T = 1 forms a fixed point. Introducing
yt = min(xt−1, . . . , xt−T ) and zt = max(xt−1, . . . , xt−T ),
(11) implies
yt−1 < yt < zt < zt−1 unless xt−1 = · · · = xt−T .
From the bounded T -vector sequence we can choose a convergent subsequence
(xtl−1, . . . , xtl−T ) with a limit (x
∗
−1, . . . , x
∗
−T ). If it is not flat, then for the corre-
sponding maximum, z∗∗ < z∗ holds, contradicting the implication.
Returning to the time-variant adjustment process, it can be made more compact by
making a transformation. Introducing notation Ut−1 =
∑T
k=1 ut−k, (9) can be rewritten
as
τtut = δψUt−1.
Repeating it as τt−1ut−1 = δψUt−2, we obtain a more compact T + 1-order difference
equation:
ut =
1
τt
δψ [ut−1 − ut−T−1 + Ut−2] = [δψ + τt−1]ut−1 − δψut−T−1
τt
. (12)
Theorem 3. For exogenously varying employer’s and total pension contribution
rates, the gross wage path is endogenously determined by either (9) or (12).
Remark. Having solved either (9) or (12) for the gross wage path (ut), (4)–
(7) yield the path of total wage (wt), net wage (vt) and cohort-specific benefits (bt),
respectively.
Our minimodel can be used to illustrate numerically the latest Hungarian devel-
opments in a stylized way. We neglect a number of complications: gender differences
including Females 40 and the permanently changing retirement rules (cf. Czegle´di, Si-
monovits, Szabo´ and Tir, 2017). Rather than struggling with the actual initial states
(τt for t < 0) we choose τE = 0.10, τF−1 = 0.22, furthermore, θ
E = 0.15 + 0.085 = 0.235
and θF = 0.05 implying δ = 0.023 (close to the steady state parameter values of Table
2, first row, g = 1.0).
The most important parameter values of the shock concerning the gross wage cost
dynamics are as follows: there is an acceleration from the long-term growth rate of 2%.
It is assumed that the employer’s pension contribution rate τFt drops from 0.22 (t = −1)
to 0.09 (t = 5) at a decelerated rate and then stays there (column 2 of Table 4). (While
in the real process, a year of fast wage growth prepared the way for a 5%point reduction
in the next year, here the reduction is distributed between two years.) As the mirror
image, the endogenous real growth rate of the total wage suddenly rises step by step
to 11.7% (in t = 5) and then drops to 3.8% by t = 6. Note, however, that the low
contribution rate can only be sustained if the total wage cost accelerates again from 3.8
to 5.9% and when the youngest pensioner of the older regime dies in t = 19, the implied
growth rate is already equal to 5.9%. A terrifying consequence of this policy is that the
ratio of the youngest to the oldest pensioner’s benefit is equal to 3.35!
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Table 4. Forced reduction of contribution rate: long
Employer’s
pension R e a l g r o w t h Initial
contribution r a t e o f pension
Year rate net wage total wage benefit
t τFt 100(gvt − 1) 100(gwt − 1) bt
–1 0.22 0 0 0.528
0 0.19 10.3 7.7 0.528
1 0.17 8.0 6.2 0.583
2 0.15 9.0 7.2 0.629
3 0.13 10.3 8.5 0.686
4 0.11 11.8 9.9 0.756
5 0.09 13.7 11.7 0.846
6 0.09 3.8 3.8 0.962
· · · · · ·
12 0.09 4.8 4.8 1.232
· · · · · ·
19 0.09 5.9 5.9 1.769
Remark. τt = τE + τFt .
Table 5 displays a sensible solution of the emerging crisis: stop the reduction process
at τF2 = 0.15, i.e. with the total rate τ2 = 0.2 (the previous rows are the same as those
in Table 5 above, therefore they are dropped). Then the induced real wage growth rates
would be rather modest: the long run growth rate diminishes to 2.9%—close to row
4 of Table 2. Then the adaptation is not so erratic than before but its realism is still
doubtful.
Table 5. Forced reduction of contribution rate: short
Employer’s
pension R e a l g r o w t h Initial
contribution r a t e o f pension
Year rate net wage total wage benefit
t τFt 100(g
v
t − 1) 100(gwt − 1) bt
· · · · · ·
2 0.15 9.0 7.2 0.629
3 0.15 1.5 1.5 0.686
4 0.15 1.5 1.5 0.696
· · · · · ·
12 0.15 2.2 2.2 0.804
· · · · · ·
18 0.15 2.8 2.8 0.928
19 0.15 2.9 2.9 0.954
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5. Exogenous contribution rates and total wages
In Section 4, we determined the evolution of gross wages induced by the exogenously
varying contribution rates. Now we give up this assumption and let the gross wage and
the contribution rate vary together, allowing for temporary imbalance between revenues
and expenditures. (For example, the imbalance can be absorbed by the quite flexible
health budget.) We also model rising normal retirement age. (N.B. In Hungary, NRA
rises from 63 years (2016) to 65 years (2022) by four months every year.) We do not
model its impact on the time spent in retirement (as if it were annulled by a parallel
rise in the life expectancy) but we allow for rising length of contribution until 2019:
St = 33 + 0.5(t− 2016) for t = 2016, 2017, 2018 and St = 35 later. (13)
Also, we diminish the entry of new pensioners by half until 2022, represented by multi-
plier at in (14) below, being equal to 0.7 until 2022 and then 1 (an ad hoc assumption).
To get rid of the complex problem of benefits in 2016 granted k = 1, 2, . . . , T years
earlier, we model the pension expenditures like
Bt = Bt−1 + δ(atStvt−1 − S2015v2015). (14)
Furthermore, pension revenues are given as
Rt = τtStut. (15)
We do not insist on the equilibrium of the system.
We compare three scenarios: Scenario 1 depicts the forced reduction of pension
contribution rate as a feasible process due to high wage growth. Scenario 2 describes the
process as infeasible due to slower wage growth. Scenario 3 stops the forced reduction
to maintain the equilibrium. The numbers are given in percentages. Revenues and
expenditures are given in terms of the initial revenue.
Scenario 1. Persistently fast wage growth and fast reduction of pension
contribution rate
The first scenario (displayed in Table 6) is consistent with the government plan but it
assumes very fast real total wage growth, namely 5% per year.
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Table 6.
Persistently fast wage growth and fast reduction of pension contribution rate
Pension contrib- Real growth rate P e n s i o n
Year ution rate of total wage revenues expenditures
t τt 100(gwt − 1) Rt Bt
2016 0.32 7.4 100.0 95.6
2017 0.27 5.9 94.4 94.5
2018 0.245 5.8 93.9 93.9
2019 0.225 5.2 93.6 93.6
2020 0.205 5.2 91.3 93.6
2021 0.185 5.1 88.1 93.9
2022 0.185 5.1 92.5 94.6
2023 0.185 5.0 97.2 97.8
2024 0.185 5.0 102.0 101.4
2025 0.185 5.0 107.1 105.3
Scenario 2. Decelerating wage growth and fast reduction of pension contri-
bution rate
The second scenario (Table 7) reduces the total wage growth rate to a feasible value
namely 3% starting with 2019 but the government continues its reduction program.
Then the gap between the revenues and the expenditures widens and by 2022 reaches
8% of the initial revenues, amounting to 1% of the GDP.
Table 7.
Decelerating wage growth and fast reduction of pension contribution rate
Pension contrib- Real growth rate P e n s i o n
Year ution rate of total wage revenues expenditures
t τt 100(gwt − 1) Rt Bt
2019 0.225 3.2 91.9 93.6
2020 0.205 3.2 87.9 93.5
2021 0.185 3.2 83.3 93.7
2022 0.185 3.0 85.8 94.0
2023 0.185 3.0 88.3 96.7
2024 0.185 3.0 91.0 99.5
2025 0.185 3.0 93.7 102.6
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Scenario 3. Decelerating wage growth and reduction of pension contribution
rate
The third scenario (Table 8) adjusts the pension contribution rate to the decelerating
total real wage growth. Stopping at 20.5 rather than 18.5, the equilibrium is more or
less preserved.
Table 8.
Decelerating wage growth and pension contribution rate
Pension contrib- Real growth rate P e n s i o n
Year ution rate of total wage revenues expenditures
t τt 100(gwt − 1) Rt Bt
2019 0.225 3.2 91.9 93.6
2020 0.205 3.2 87.9 93.5
2021 0.205 3.0 90.5 93.7
2022 0.205 3.0 93.2 93.9
2023 0.205 3.0 96.0 96.4
2024 0.205 3.0 98.9 99.2
2025 0.205 3.0 101.9 102.1
Even this scenario maintains a distorted pension profile where the benefits of those
who retired in 2019 are cc. 28% higher than the benefits of those who retired in 2016.
Note that these runs are quite primitive and further examinations are needed to
corroborate their robustness.
5. Conclusions
Under price indexation of pensions in progress, a temporary acceleration of the total
real wage dynamics makes room for a similar reduction of the pension contribution
rate, further accelerating the gross and net real wage dynamics. We underline that
such a policy presupposes a permanently high potential growth (5–6% vs. 2–3% per
year), moreover, it creates unbearable unfairness among subsequent cohorts. It would
be interesting to know if the ‘social planner’ is aware of these problems or not.
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